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RECENT CASES
APPEAL AND ERROR-NELIGENCE OF ATroR v AS EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO
WITHIN THE TI=E ALLOWED BY STATu -- The petitioner directed

APPEAL

counsel to defend it in ;in action and to take an appeal if necessary "to protect
the interest of the estate." The .petitioner was defended in said action. However, it did not learn of the adverse judgment until the period allowed by
statute for appeal had already expired. It then sought a rehearing under a
statute' granting relief when the failure to appeal has been due to circumstances "without the control" of the aggrieved party. Held, (four judges
dissenting), that the petitioner be granted the appeal. Frank v. Union Trust
Co., 215 N. W. 26 (Mich. 1927).
The principal case represents a lenient view in allowing a belated appeal.
The petition was granted without an allegation that the judgment appealed
from was wrongful. However, the Michigan Act, unlike a very similar Wisconsin Statute,; does not call for a showing that "justice demands a review of
the cause." Hence the case rests squarely on the grounds that counsel's negligent failure to appeal is a circumstance "without the control" of the client.
The Michigan court justifies its ruling on the theory that the time for taking
an appeal is without the knowledge of the average citizen, and that an attorney is an officer of the court, therefore a proper person to rely upon. Many
jurisdictions hold that where the failure to appeal is due solely to official
delinquency in a legal duty relief may be granted.3 However, the statement
of counsel's official capacity and a consequent analogy with the general rule
just stated does not prove very helpful because of the well recognized agency
relationship between a client and his attorney.' It is for this latter reason many
courts have decided that the negligence of counsel is the negligence of the
party he represents.' In analogous cases, under a statute requiring the showing of "good cause,"' courts have laid down the rule that the petitioner must
allege such good cause as would entitle equity to enjoin the judgment protested.! Equitable relief for this purpose is generally limited to cases of fraud
and collusion. It has never been successfully invoked where the complainant's
Comrp. LAws § I440o8 (Mich. 1915).
'REv. STAT. § 4035 (Wis. 1919). See Oakley v. Davidson, 103 Wis. 98, 79
N. W. 27 ('899).
'United States v. Adams, 73 U. S. 101 (1867) ; Knight v. Towles, 32 Fla.
473, 14 SO. 91 (1893) ; Cameron v. Calklns, 43 Mich. 191, 5 N. W. 292 (i88o).
'See Notes in 2o Ann. Cas. 396 (I11) and 31 L. R. A. 36 (1895).
'Clark v. Stevens, 55 Iowa 361, 7 N. W. 591 (i88o) ; Kern v. Straussberger, 71 Ill. 413 (1874); Beale v. Swasey, io6 Me. 35, 75 Atl. I34 (io9).
Also see Scroggin v. Hammet Grocery Co., 66 Ark. I83, 49 S. W. 820 (I899);
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2o Ky. L. Rep., 1537, 49 S. W. 794 (899).
e 2 W. VA. CODE ANNq. §2728 (Hogg, 1913).
'Powell v. Miller, 41 W. VA. 371, 23 S. E. 557 (1895).
'See Note, 30 L. R. A. 786 (1895).
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attorney negligently failed to appeal. In other cases, negligence of counsel
is not "accident, mistake, or unforeseen cause" within the meaning of such a
statute. " The Pennsylvania Act expressly allows no grounds whatsoever for
The principal case, while it seems a
exemption from the period granted.'
justifiable construction of the Michigan statute, certainly marks an extension
of the usual grounds for allowing a belated appeal.

CONT.mP1,-RxMovAL OF AssErs ArTE THE APPOINTMENT OF A REcErvmE
BAN cuvcy-After a receiver in bankruptcy for the defendant's business
had been appointed, the defendant secretly removed a large amount of the
assets. The receiver brought contempt proceedings for this interference. Held,
that defendant has committed a civil contempt. In re Marcus, 21 F. (2d) 483
(W. D. Pa. 19027).
iN

Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights
of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders and decrees made
for enforcing the rights and administering the remedies to which the court
has found them to be entitled. On the other hand, -criminal contempt proceedings are prosecuted to preserve the power and dignity of the courts and to
punish for disobedience of their orders.! It is well settled that the appointment
of a receiver is sufficient to make a subsequent interference with the assets a contempt! This was conceded in the principal case, the question being whether
the acts of the defendant constituted a civil or a criminal contempt. If it was
a civil contempt the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial, but if it was a
criminal contempt he was entitled to a jury trial. The court thought it the
former because the relief desired was a return of the assets. However, this
seems to ignore the fact that the property was in the custody of the law, an
interference with which is a criminal contempt
Under similar circumstances,
it has been decided that the concealment of assets by a bankrupt is a criminal
contempt,' and it is submitted that that decision is more consonant with the
logic of the situation.
Palmer v. Gardiner, 77 Ill. 143 (1875) ; Ruppertsberger v. Clark & Co.,
53 Md. 402 (1879). See Morgan's Appeal, no Pa. 271, 275 (1885).

"Allen and Reed, Inc. v. Russell, 33 RMI. 422, 82 Atl. 129 (i912) ; Bolster
v. Bolster, 35 R. I. 367, 87 At. 23 (1913).
Act of 1889, P. L. i58 §3, PA. STAT. (West, i920o) §55o.
'In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 458 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; it re Morse, 98
Vt. 35, 126 Atl. 550 (924) ; OSWALD,CONTEMPT (3d ed. i9io) 36.
'In re Nevitt, In re Morse, both supra note I.
'In re Dialogue, 215 Fed. 462 (D. C. N. J. 1914) ; In re Paris Mfg. Co.,
33 A. B. R. 565 (D. C. Mo. 1911).
'RAPALjE, CONTEMPT (1887) 25, cited with approval in Ex parte Stroud,
167 Ark.331, 268 S. W. 13 (925).
'Clay v.Waters, 178 Fed. 385, 394 (C. C. A. 8th, 1go) in holding a criminal contempt, "The filing of the petition in bankruptcy and the adjudication
which followed it embodied in themselves a commanding injunction of the
-court against the interference of the defendant with and his concealment and
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CONTRMUToRY NEGLIGENCE-DUTY TO ALIGHT FROM VEHICLE BEFoRE
CROSSING RAILROAD-The plaintiff's intestate was struck by the defendant's
train while driving a truck over a highway crossing with which he was familiar.
The defendant's section house obstructed the view of the track. On approaching the crossing, the plaintiff's intestate slowed down to five or six miles per
hour, looked as far as practicable from the driver's seat, and listened, but did
not alight from the vehicle. Held, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's
intestate was guilty of contributory negligence. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v.
Goodman, U. S. Sup. Ct, decided Oct. 31, 1927.

Failure to look and listen' before entering upon an unobscured railroad
crossing will be contributory negligence in most states, either as a matter of
fact,' or of law.' And where, as in this case, the driver of the vehicle was
familiar with the crossing, most courts will rule as a matter of law.' If the
view is unobscured, a few- jurisdictions impose on a driver an additional duty
to stop before entering upon a crossing, an omission to do which will be contributory negligence as a matter of law.' In general, when the view of the
6
track is obstructed, the duty of the driver is only to stop, look and listen And
the plaintiff is bound to the same standard of care, although, as in this case,
the view is obstructed by railroad property.7 A considerable number of states
require the driver to alight from his vehicle and inspect the track at an obscured crossing, if listening is not sufficient protection, and allow the jury
removal from the trustee and the court of any property of the bankrupt.
Against the defendant and against all others who had no valid lien upon or
interest in that property at the time of the adjudication, the injunction and
command of the court against such interference and removal and notice thereof
to all the world was embodied in the injunction and issued therewith by the
settled law of the land

.

.

and removal constituted contempt of that

court."
1

Boston and Me. R. R. v. Daniel, 29o Fed. 916 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) ; Chicago,
etc., R. R. v. Gersten, 15 I1. App. 614 (1884) ; Kirkland v. Atchison, etc., R. R.,
io4 Kan. 388, 179 Pac. 362 (I919).
'Watts v. Wabash Ry., 219 Ill. App. 549 (192o); Sullivan v. Boston and

Mass. 188, 136 N. E. 373 (1922); Dickinson v. Erie R. R.,
See Note (1923) 71 U. oF PA. L. REV. 153.
'Philadelphia and Reading Ry. v. Skerman, 247 Fed. 269 (C. C. A. 2d,
1917) ; Bush v. Union Pacific R. R., 62 Kan. 709, 64 Pac. 624 (90); (1922)

Maine R. R.,

242

8I N. J.L. 464, 8I At. IO4 (1911).

OF PA. L. REV. 337.
Mobile, etc., R. R. v. Coerver, 112 Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902); Miller
v. West Jersey & Seashore R. R., 257 Pa. 517, IOI Atl. 766 (1917) ; Sweeo v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry., 183 Wis. 234, 197 N. W. 8o5 (1924).

70 U.

'Walker v. Southern Pacific R. R., 38 Cal. App. 377, 176 Pac. 175 (1918);
Cline v. McAdoo, 85 W. Va. 524, 1O2 S.E. :218 (192o); Bm.RRY, AUTOMOBILES
(3d ed. 1921) §685.
6
Brommer v. Pennsylvania R. R., 179 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 3d, 191o) ; Gage
v. Atchison, etc., R. R., 91 Kan. 253, 137 Pac. 938 (1914). Contra: Allen v.
Boston, etc., R. R., 197 Mass. 298, 83 N. E. 863 (1908).
"Young v. Southern Pacific Co., 182 Cal. 369, 19o Pac. 36 (192o) ; Cavendish v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 95 W. Va. 490, 121 S.E. 498 (1924).
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3
to consider an omission to alight as evidence of contributory negligence. But
almost
alone
Pennsylvania
was
R.
v.
Goodman,
until Baltimore and Ohio R.
in ruling as a matter of law that a driver will be guilty of contributory negligence unless he alights at a crossing where the view is obstructed, and inspects
The standard of conduct imposed by this
the track from a point of vantage
rule seems stringent, as the defendant, by the location of its section house, subjected the plaintiff to additional risk, against which he would not be protected
by an ordinary degree of care.

CORPoRATIONs--LiABiUTY OF PaENT CORPORATION ON CONTRACT OF ITS
SuBsmDmY-The plaintiff leased a theatre for a term of years to the A corporation. Some years before the lease expired, the defendant corporation, a
holding company for a chain of theatres, bought the entire stock of the A corporation and appointed as officers and directors persons holding similar positions
in the parent corporation. While thus controlled, the A corporation negotiated
a contract with the plaintiff, extending the period of the lease. Subsequently
the defendant sold the stock of the A corporation to other persons, under
whose control it failed to fulfill its agreements under the lease extension. Held,
that the parent corporation could not be held on the contract of its subsidiary,
merely because it completely controlled it through the ownership of its stock and
the appointment of its officers and directors, since it was not further shown that
the parent corporation exercised its control unfairly or in bad faith. Majestic
Company v. Orpheum Circuit,21 F. (2d) 72o (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
The basic theory of corporation law is one of limited liability. It is not
illegal nor dishonest for a corporate person, any more than for a natural one,
to seek to do business on such a basis of limited liability, by means of controlling a subsidiary corporation through the ownership of its stock1 However,
this separation of capacities can easily be abused, especially where the corporation is the sole stockholder. In such a case, if the relationship of principal
and agent can be shown, or if the elements of an estoppel or fraud are present,
there is no doubt that the parent corporation can be held on the contracts of the
subsidiary.' Yet cases of patent injustice have arisen that could not be disposed
of strictly on these grounds, and to secure justice the courts have been forced
to disregard the corporate entity. The courts have not laid down any definite
'Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Kilmer, 231 Fed. 628 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ; Nichols
v. Grand Trunk W. R. R., 203 Mich. 372, i68 N. W. io46 (1918); De Vriendt
v. Chicago, etc., Ry., I44 Minn. 467, 175 N. W. 99 (i919).
'Thompson v. Southern Pacific Co., 31 Cal. App. 567, i6I Pac. 21 (1916);
Chicago & E. R. R. v. Thomas, 55 Ind. 634, 58 N. E. 1040 (I9OO) ; Follmer v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 246 Pa. 367, 92 Atl. 340 (1914).
'N. Y. Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 25o Fed. 668 (C. C. A 6th, i918); Richmond Construction Co. v. Richmond R. R., 68 Fed. 105 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895);
Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (924).
2Interstate Telegraph Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., 51 Fed. 49 (C. C. Md. 1892);
see N. Y. Trust Co. v. Carpenter, supra note I, at 674.
''For a thorough discussion of the problem involved, see Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF. L. REv. i2

RECENT CASES
tests to determine when the separate entity will be ignored. According to
Ballantine, liability of the parent cannot be predicated on factors of control
alone, but the problem that the court must decide in each case is v;hether or
not the corporate privilege was exercised in good faith for legitimate ends.5
This is essentially the view of the court in the instant case, and a view that
finds wide support in recent cases. This case is interesting because of the
numerous points on good faith in. the exercise of corporate privilege, which its
decision involves. It is submitted that the case is well decided on its facts, and
that the major premise of the decision, while it presents no hard and fast test,
affords the only sound method of protecting honest limitation of liability while
preventing its abuse.
DAMAGES-REcovERY OF LIQUDATED DAMAGES AFTER ABANDONMENT BY
THE CONTRACTOR-A contracted with B to build ships for B. Payments were

to be made at certain stagei, time was declared to be of the essence, and a certain sum per diem was provided as liquidated damages for failure to complete
at the time specified. C went surety on a bond indemnifying B for any or all
loss he might sustain. A, after the date set for completion, abandoned the
contract and became bankrupt. B completed the contract and sues C for
liquidated damages. Held, that B can recover liquidated damages from the date
specified for completion to the time it would have, taken the contractor to complete at his then rate of progress. Southern Pacific Company v. Globe Indemnity Company, 2z F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
The majority of cases hold that abandonment of the contract by the contractor prevents the recovery of liquidated damages for delay, on the theory that
abandonment was not contemplated by the parties
Other cases do not allow recovery after abandonment because of a fear that if the owner were allowed to
(1925) ; Canfield, Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 17 COL. L.
REV. 127 (917) ; (0924) 72 U. oF PA. L. REv. i 5 8; (1926) 36 Y.ALE L. J. 254;
(1926) io MINis. L. REv. 598.
' The early cases proc.eeded on the grounds of agency, estoppel or fraud,
Interstate Telegraph Co. v. B. & 0. R. R., supr note 2; In re Muncie Pulp
Co., i39 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 2d, I9o5) ; and hesitated to go further, Richmond
Construction Co. v. Richmond R. I., supra note I. Then the doctrine of liability
predicated on complete control was advanced, In re Watertown Pulp Co., 169
Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 2d, Igo9), but the present tendency is to modify it, N. Y.
Trust Co. v. Carpenter, supra note i.
'BAL.ANTINE, PRIVATE CoRoR&TioNs (0927) 36-37.
6City of Holland v. Holland City Gas, 257 Fed. 679 (C. C. A. 6th, i919);
Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (i92i); Ambridge Borough v.
Philadelphia Co., 283 Pa. 5, 129 Atl. 67 (1926) ; N. Y. Trust Co. v. Carpenter,
supra note x. Cf. Luckenback S. S. Co. v. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A.
4th, 192o) ; Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co., 134 Minn. 209, 158
N. W. 979 (I916).
'Bedford

v. Miller, 212 F. 368 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914) ; Phaneuf v. Corey,

19o Mass. 237, 76 N. E. 718 (igo6)'; Moses v. Autuono, 56 Fla. 499, 47 So. 925
(I908); City of Rainiers v. Masters, 79 Or. 534, 154 Pac. 426 (i916) ; WILLus-

TON, CONTRACTS (2d, 1926) § 785; Brightman, Liquidated Damages (1925) 25
Col. L. Rev. 277.
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recover, he would be enabled to delay unnecessarily and to charge such delay to
2
the contractor or surety. In the principal case the court said they could see no
justification for the rule, at least where the contractor abandons after the time
for completion has passed. Some part of the liquidated damages has accrued,
and the only remaining difficulty is one of proof of the time it would have taken
the contractor to complete. They also pointed out that the courts will be careful
not to permit the contractor to be charged with liability for any delay occasioned
by the owner.' Under this decision the determination of the length of time is
left to the jury. There is a possibility that the owner might be encouraged
to delay, but the contractor has opportunity to show this, if a fact, to the jury
to offset any tendency they might have to find for the owner. The solution
offered by the court seems to be an adequate one.
HuSBAND

AND

W

E--DIsABILiTy

OPERATES IN FAVOR OF HUSBAND'S

PREVENTING

Surr AGAINST

HuSBAND

EMPLoYm-Plaintiff sued to recover for in-

juries sustained in defendant'g car as a result of the negligent driving of the
plaintiff's husband, a servant of the defendant. Held, that recovery be denied.
Riser v. Riser, 215 N. W. 290 (Mich. 1927).
At common law, because of the theory of identity, a wife could not sue
her husband.' And, although this rule has in some places been modified by
statutes and decisions,' a majority of jurisdictions,' among them Michigan,'
still deny the wife the right to sue her husband for a personal tort. The court
in the principal case approved of an Iowa case' which appears to be one of the
few cases involving precisely the same point. In that case it was reasoned that
where there is no recovery against a servant, there can be no recovery against
the servant's master; that a wife being unable to recover in tort against her
husband must be unable to recover against her husband's master. Such
reasoning and such a result necessarily demand an interpretation of the nature
of the rule denying the wife recovery against the husband. If the rule
implies that a husband owes no substantive tort duty to a wife, clearly there was

'Lembke v. Chin Wing, 17 B. C. 218, 4 D. L. R. 431 (1912); Shields v.
Shields Construction Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 286, 86 Atl. 958 (1913).
'School District v. De Lano, 96 Kan. 499, 152 Pac. 668 (1915); Watson v.
De Witt County, ig Tex. Civ. App. I5O, 46 S. W. io6i (1898); Comey v.
United Surety Co., 16o App. Div. 698, 145 N. Y. Supp. 674, aff'd. 217 N. Y.
268, III N. E. 832 (1916) ; Bankers' Surety Co. v. Elk Horn River Co., 214
F. 342 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
'Heckman v. Heckman, 215 Pa. 203, 64 Atl. 425 (19o6).
'See Note 33 YALE L. J. 315 (1924).
'Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (191o); Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn.
427, 1O7 N. W. 1047 (igio); Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, x96 N. Y. Supp.
113 (1922). Contra: Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914) ; Wait
v. Pearce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475 (1926) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C.
566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923).
" Harvey v. Harvey, 214 N. W. 3o5 (Mich. 1927).
'Maine v. Maine 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N. W. 2o (1924). Schubert v. August
Schubert Wagon Co., 222 N. Y. Supp. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1927), noted in (1927) 37
YALE L. J. 267, reaches the same result on different reasoning.

RECENT CASES
no tort committed and the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot be applied. If
on the other hand the rule does not deny the husband's duty, but merely bars
the remedy,6 the question still remains whether the remedy against the master
should be similarly barred. The answer would seem to be in the affirmative.
If the wife be allowed to recover the husband will be accountable to the master.
The result of the husband's accounting will be that if the husband and wife
under the law of the jurisdiction share their property in common the parties'
situation will be the same after as before litigation; or if the wife, under the
law of the jurisdiction," holds her personal property separately she will have
attained by indirection the very thing the rule forbids. If the rule is to be upheld, the decision in the principal case is unescapable.
MORTGAGES-RIGHT OF PAYOR TO COMPEL ASSIGNMENT BY MORTGAGEEThe defendant held a first mortgage and an interest in a second mortgage on
the plaintiff's property.- The defendant obtained a decree of foreclosure on
the first mortgage. Before the sale the plaintiff arranged with a third party,
who was an absolute stranger to both mortgages 'and had no interest in the
property, for a loan sufficient to satisfy the defendant's claim under the first
mortgage, on condition that the lender should be subrogated to the defendant's rights under the decree and receive an assignment of the mortgage from
the defendant. The defendant refused to assign, because of her interest in the
second mortgage, and the plaintiff brought this bill to compel the assignment.
Held, that the relief requested should be granted. French v. Grand Beach Co.,
215 N. W. 13 (Mich. 1927).
A mere volunteer who pays the debt of another will not be subrogated to
the rights of the creditor whom he pays But one not a mere volunteer, who
pays the debt of another, will be subrogated to all the rights and priorities of
the creditor whom he pays, even though there is no agreement to that effect?
One is not a mere volunteer if he has some liability for the debt, as a surety ;
or some interest in the property to protect, as a junior lienor;' or if he pays the
debt at the request of the debtor.5 And even a stranger will be subrogated to
The remedy is barred, not on any procedural ground, but because no
right is invaded as the husband and wife are identical. Phillips v. Barnett, i
Q. B. D. 436 (1876) ; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877) ; Libby v. Berry,
74 Me. 286 (1883).
"Laskowski v. People's Ice Co. 203 Mich. 186, 168 N. W. 940 (1918);
Harvey v. Harvey, supra note 4.
'Bouton v. Cameron, 205 Ill. 50, 28 N. E. 8oo (1903) ; Newell v. Hadley, 2o6
Mass. 335, 92 N. E. 5o7 (igog); Lackawanna Trust Co. v. Gomeringer, 236
Pa. 179, 84 Atl. 757 (1912).
'Warford v. Hankins, 15o Ind. 489 (1898) ; Sands v. Durham, 98 Va. 392,
63 S. E. 145 (19oo).
'American Bonding Co. v. National Bank, 97 Md. 598, 55 AtI. 395 (1903);
New Bedford Inst. v. Hathaway, 134 Mass. 69 (1883).
'Fitcher v. Griffiths, 2z6 Mass. 174, 103 N. E. 471 (1913); Patterson v.
Birdsall, 64 N. Y. 294 (1876) ; Haverford Loan Assn. v. Fire Assn., 18o Pa.
523, 37 At. 179 (I897).
'Home Savings Bank v. Bierstadt,. i68 Ill. 618, 48 N. E. I61 (I897);
Simonson v. Lauck, io5 App. Div. 82, 93 N. Y. Supp. 965 (igo5).
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the rights of the creditor whom he pays, if he pays the debt under an agreement that he be subrogated, or if such is his evident intention in paying it."
These rules are just, because they afford protection to the payor, leave the
junior lienor in his former position, and often aid the debtor to save his property. Generally, however, the courts will not compel an assignment of the
mortgage to a third party who pays it off, because he is protected by the subrogation doctrine, and because the mortgagee should only be required to satisfy
the mortgage, not assign it, as that is all he has contracted to do.' There is,
however, a modem tendency to compel the assignment to the payor wherever
he would be subrogated, because if the mortgagee's claim is satisfied, it should
be immaterial to him whether he discharge the mortgage and the payor becomes
subrogated, or whether he assign it? It would seem that there is a valid ground
for compelling the assignment in such cases, as a formal assignment facilitates
recording, without creating any more rights or liabilities in any of the parties
than would arise under the subrogation doctrine.

N

IGmENcE-ADMImALTy-LIAI=y

oF ToRTFEAiOR TO EMPLOYER OF AN

SEAMAN-Through the claimant's negligence a towing hawser swept
the deck of the libellant's barge and injured one of the libellant's seamen. The
libellant was obliged to pay for the maintenance and care of the seaman, an
obligation to care for the seaman being implied in the contract of employment.1
A libel was filed for the amount thus paid out, on the theory that the claimant's act was the proximate cause of this damage to the libellant. The decree
was for the claimant, and the libellant appealed. Held, that the libellant could
INJURFD

not recover. The FederalNo. 2, 31 F.

(2d)

313 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).

The decision adopts the rule that a person who is damaged pecuniarily
through his contractual relations with the person injured by a tortious act cannot recover from the actor, unless the latter acted with intent to affect the contractual relations2 The theory of the rule is that, since the person pecuniarily
damaged would not have been affected had it not been for the contract, the
damage is too remote from the act for the actor to be held liable for the dam6

Wilkins v. Gibson, 113 Ga. 31, 3o S. E. 374 (igor) ; Nestor v. Davis, 1oo

Miss. 199, 56 So. 347 (911).
"Platte Valley Co. v. Bosserman-Gates Co., 2o2 Fed. 692 (C.C. A. 8th,
1912).

Fitcher v. Griffiths, supra note 4; Shirk v. Cornell, 136 Md. 390, 111 Atl.
217 (192o) ; Holland v. Citizens Bank, 16 R. 1.734 (1889).

9Simonson v. Lauck, supra note 5; Manilla Brewing Co. v. Raw Silk Co.,

163 App. Div. 30, 148 N. Y. Supp. 119 (1914) ; Hopkins v. Keterrer, 237 Pa.
285, 85 At. 421 (1912). Pennsylvania has now settled by statute that a mort-

gagor, on tendering debt, interest, and costs to the mortgagee, may compel him
to assign the mortgage to a third party. Act of May 4, 1927, No. 361.

'The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158 (i9o2); The Hanna Neilsen, 273 Fed. 171
(C. C. A. 2d, 1921 ) ; Holt v. Cummings, 102 Pa. 212 (1883).

'Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754 (1877); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. N. Y., etc., R. R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856); Anthony v. Slaid, ii Metc. 290
(Mass. 1846).
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age to the contract! However, the rule which applies the ordinary rules of
negligence to monetary loss, as well as to bodily hurt or property harm, seems
preferable.' If the actor, as a reasonable man, should have known of the
existence of the contract, the monetary damage is as foreseeable as is the bodily
hurt or property harm. The claimant was itself an employer of seamen and
should reasonably have been aware of the libellant's obligation to care for its seamen, for such an obligation is iiiplied by law in every contract of employment of
seamen. For this reason the court might well have held that the claimant
did owe a duty to the libellant. Furthermore, where one person has been compelled to pay the damages which ought to have been paid by another he may
recover over from the wrongdoer by being subrogated to the rights of the
injured person,' for every person should bear the burden of his own wrongdoing. Ordinarily, however, courts have refused to subrogate a person who
has been compelled to pay only because of his contractual relations with or concerning the injured person.' But the fact that a person had to pay only because of a contract, it is submitted, should not overweigh the consideration that
such person has borne the burden of another's wrongdoing, especially in view
of the fact that the libellant did not voluntarily undertake 'to care for the
seaman, but was forced to do so by a positive legal duty imposed by statute.'

PRINCIPAL AND AGuNT-STATUS OFAN ARCHITE_:CT IN GIVING A CERTIFICATE
oF PRocmEss-The defendant, an architect, negligently granted interim certificates whereby plaintiffs, as building owners, were misled into paying twice for
the same work. Held, that the defendant acted as an agent for the building
owner when giving an interim certificate and is, accordingly, liable for his
negligence. Wesbach Rural District Council v. Ward, [I927] 2 K. B. 556.
Whether an architect is acting as an agent or arbitrator in issuing certificates, either interim or final, is usually important in determining his liability
for negligence. If he is held to be an arbitrator he is generally relieved from
liability' on the same reasoning that exempts judges from liability for acts

'Anthony v Slaid, supra note 2.
'Flint v. Robins D. D. Co., 13 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; The Jersey
City, 43 Fed. 66 (E. D. N. Y. 189o) ; Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135
N. E. 275 (1922).
' The Osceola, The Hanna Neilsen, Holt v. Cummings, all supra note I.
'The Jersey City, supra note 4.
'The Jersey City, supra note 4; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Campania Transatlatic Espanola, I34 N. Y. 461, 31 N. E. 987 (1892); New Castle
v. Kurtz, 210 Pa. x83 (1904).
' Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. N. Y., etc., R. R., Anthony v. Slaid, all
supra note 2.
'The Osceola, The Hanna Neilsen, Holt v. Cummings, all supra note I.
Chambers v. Goldthorpe [1901] I K. B. 624; Stevenson v. Watson, 4 C. P.
D. 148 (1879); Restell v. Nye [igoi] I K. B. 624. However, there are some
cases which hold the architect liable for negligence even though he is acting
as a quasi-arbitrator on the theory that he is a professional person who owes
a duty of a reasonable degree of care and skill to his employer. Bruce v. James,
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done in their official capacity. On the other hand, if he is held to be an agent,
the
owner
by
the well established rule that an agent is liable to
he is liable to
his principal for negligence His status must be determined by an examination
of the terms of the contract.' The architect is usually considered as an arbitrator where he grants the certificate as a result of his professional knowledge,
skill and judgment' where he is bound to exercise his judgment impartially
as between the two parties to the building contract,6 and where such certificate
is conclusive of the building owner's liability to the contractor.
In absence
of such tests he is treated as an agent.' In the principal case the contract ' between the contractor and building owner provided that the interim certificates
were not to be conclusive. The defendant was neither deciding a dispute nor
striking a final balance. He was merely doing work for the defendant, and
was held liable for not performing such work carefully, as was his duty.

PROCEDURE-AcCOUNT RENDER IN THE PENNSYLVANIA PRACIcE ACTSection i of the Pennsylvania Practice Act of 1915 provides that an accounting may be asked for where the plaintiff is unable to state the exact amount
due him by the defendant. Section 17 of the Act provides that a judgment
may be given by the prothonotary in an action of assumpsit when an amount
is admitted to be due in the affidavit of defense. This was an action of assumpsit by one co-tenant against another co-tenant asking therein for an account.
Plaintiff secured a judgment from the prothonotary for the amount admitted to
be due in the affidavit of defense. Subsequently, the court made absolute a rule
to strike the judgment from the record. On appeal, Held, that the judgment
was rightly stricken off, as Section 17 of the Practice Act of 1915 has no application to actions for account brought under Section ii of said Act. Duggan
v. Duggan, 9i Pa. Super. 369 (1927).
12 D. L. R. 469 (Manitoba,

1913); Badgley v. Dickson, 13 Ont. App. 494

(1886) ; Saunders v. Broadstairs Local Board, 2 HUDSON, BUILDING CONTRACTS

(4th ed. 1914) 159.
'Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 74, 6 N. W. 140 (i88o); Hoosac Tunnel Dock
and Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424, 5o Am. Rep. 323 (1884) ; Hutchins
v. Merrill, iog Me. 313, 84 AtI. 412 (i912).
'Chambers v. Goldthorpe, supra note I; Rogers v. James, 8 T. L. R. 67
(189i).

' Chambers v Goldthorpe, supra note I; Rogers v. James, supra note 3;

see note, 78 L. T. 164 (1927).
'Stevenson v. Watson, supra note I, at 158.

' Chambers v. Goldthorpe, supra note I, at 638.
Chambers v. Goldthorpe, Stevenson v. Watson, both supra note I.
'Rogers v. James, supra note 3; Corey v. Eastman, i66 Mass. 279, 44 N. E.
217 (1896); Williams v. Chicago, Santa Fe and California R. R., 112 Mo. 463,
20 S. W. 631 (1892).
'The method of payment was regulated by clause 29(5), which was in the
following terms: "No certificate of the architect, except for the final balance,
shall be considered conclusive evidence of any work or materials to which it
relates nor of the value thereof, nor shall it in any way prejudice the employers
in the final settlements of the accounts in any case where the contractor has
ben overpaid during the progress of the work."
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Prior to the PracticeAct of 1915, where an accounting was sought, it could
only be obtained by the old common law action of account render, or in equity
by a bill asking for an accounting. An action of assumpsit was not available
for such a purpose.1 The procedure to be used was set forth in Section i8 of
the Act of 84o,2 and provided for a settling of the accounts by a board of
auditors appointed by the court or a determination by a jury, the latter being
the method used at common law; This procedure has not been changed or added
to by any succeeding act in Pennsylvania. It has been argued that the Practice Act of 1915 has made such a change but such an argument is untenable.
From the title of the Act itself," and from Section i' there is nothing which
would support a contention that the legislature intended to enlarge the class of
claims which may be made the subject of an action of assumpsit 8 It is true
that under Section ii an accounting may be asked for where the plaintiff does
not know the exact amount due, but even though it may be so brought the
inherent nature of the action is not changed and the proceeding must still be
carried on as at common law and under the Act of 184o. A hasty reading of
Section 17 might lead one to suppose that it can be utilized when an accounting
is asked for. But upon closer inspection it is found that it deals strictly with
actions of assumpsit, and the subject matter of that action is still the same as
before the Act. It seems that the plaintiff must still resort to his old remedy as
provided for by the Act of 184o, or he must file"a bill in equity praying for an
accounting.

TAxATIoN-TAx oN TRANsrms INTENDED To TAKE Emcr ix ENjOYMENT
Ar=a DEATH-In 1918 the decedent conveyed securities to the value of $4o,ooo
to three of her children, each of whom, by a separate instrument executed on
the same date, agreed to pay decedent $5,0o0 per year during her lifetime. The
grantees on the same day conveyed all the property to. a trustee as security for
the payments to be made by them to the decedent. The Collector of Internal
Revenue assessed and collected an estate tax on the entire fund, under the
1

Ozeas v. Johnson, i Binney 191 (Pa. i8o6) ; Andrews v. Allen, 9 S. & R.
(Pa. 1823); Russell v. Miller, 54 Pa. 154 (1867) ; Knerr v. Hoffman, 65
Pa. 126 (i87o); Wharton v. Douglass, 76 Pa. 273 (1874).
'P. L. i, § i8, PA. STAT. (West, i92o) § 1S.
'Backer v. Remov, 69 Pa. Super. 138 (1918); Comerer v. Fraker's Administrators, 29 D. R. 491 (Pa. 1920) ; Mastis v. Vincent B. & P. Society, 44
C. C. 289 (Pa. i916), "The Practise Act of 1915 applies only to actions of
assumpsit and trespass. There is a distinction between the action of account
render and an action of assumpsit."
"'Relating to practice in the courts of common pleas in actions of assumpsit
and trespass, except actions for libel and slander; prescribing the pleadings and
procedure to be observed therein."
"'Be it enacted that in actions of assumpsit and trespass, except in actions
for libel and slander, brought in any court of common pleas, the procedure shall
be as herein provided."
'Backer v. Remov, supra note 3.
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Revenue Act of 192x! In an action by the heirs to recover the amount of the
tax, Held, that only so much of the fund is taxable as was required to produce
the $1I5,oo per year which was paid to decedent. Tips v. Bass, 21 F.(2d) 46o
(D. C. Tex. 1927).

The provision of the Revenue Act of 192z that a transfer is taxable if it
is intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after death is practically
the same as similar provisions found in prior federal revenue acts and in the
legislation of various states,' many of which adopted such taxes at an early
date.' In determining whether a given transfer comes within such a provision,
the courts have looked to the measure of control which the grantor retained
over the subject matter.' The grantor may control the principal or corpus by
reserving the right to revoke, while at the same time controlling the income by
directing that it be paid to himself or to such persons as he may from time to
time designate. A transfer under such circumstances is taxable;' indeed, it is
so ambulatory as to be testamentary in character.' The transfer is likewise
within the provision if the grantor has power to control the income, even though
=
! It is only when the
there was no power to control' the principal or corpus.
grantor cannot control the subject matter or the income that the transfer is held not taxable. In general, it makes no difference what form the
transfer may take. Substance rather than form will govern. It may be a
direct creation of a trust by the grantor,"° or a prior existing trust may be
i Revenue Act of 1921, §402, 42 STAT. 278, U. S. ComP. STAT. § 63361c:
"That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated:
c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created a
trust

.

..

,

intended to take effect in possession or eijoyment at or after his

death."
'Act of Igi, P. L. 521 §IC, PA. STAT. (West, i92o) §2o465c; N. Y. Axx.
CONs. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1926) c. 6o, art. 1o § 220(2).
'Act of 1826, P. L. 227 §I.
" Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 15 F. (2d) 706 (D. C. N. Y. 1926);
Coolidge v. Nichols, 4 F.(2d) 112 (D. C. Macs. 1925) aff'd. in 47 Sup. Ct 710
(1927).
'Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, supra note 4; Starke v. United
States, 14 F.(2d) 616 (D. C. Ohio x926) ; Lines's Estate, 155 Pa. 378, 26 Atl.
728 (1893).

'Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, supra note 4.
"McCaughn v. Girard Trust Co., ii F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926);
Coolidge v. Nichols. supra note 4; Keeney's Estate, 194 N. Y. 281, 87 N. E.

428 "(I9o9); Todd's Estate, 237 Pa. 466, 85 Atl. 845 (1912) ; DuBois's Appeal,
121 Pa. 368, 15 Atl. 641 (1888).
Shukert v. Allen, 47 Sup. Ct. 461 (927); Coolidge v. Nichols, supra

note 4.
'Starke v. United States, supra note 5; Reed v. Howbert, 8 F. (2d) 641
(D. C. Col. 1925).

" Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, Coolidge v. Nichols, both supra
note 4; Starke v. United States, Lines's Estate, both supra note 5; McCaughn
v. Girard Trust Co., supra note 7.
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made use of.U As in the principal case, it may be an absolute grant coupled
with a contemporaneous agreement by the grantee,' and it would seem not to
be necessary that the grantee convey the property to a trustee as security."
The grantor in the principal case intended to reserve only a portion of the income
of the property. It necessarily follows that the grantor intended to postpone
the enjoyment by the-grantee of only so much of the property as was required
to produce the income reserved. The transfer of this portion was therefore
taxable. As the grantor had parted with all control of the residue, the transfer
of that portion took immediate effect in enjoyment and was properly held not
taxableY

TAXATION-UNONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GiFT TAx WHEN CONSTRUED
January, 1924, the plaintiff transferred by a gift inter
vivos, and not in contemplation of death, property valued at more than $85o,ooo.
The collector of internal revenue, assessed and collected a tax on the gift under
the Revenue Act of z924,' as amended
The Act, approved June 2, 1924, provided (Section 319) that "for the calendar year 1924 and each calendar year
thereafter," a tax be imposed upon the transfer by gift of any property valued
over a certain amount, wherever situated, and whether made directly or indirectly. The amendment to this section made a reduction of the rates of taxation
and further provided that these rates take effect as of June 2, 1924. This suit
seeks recovery of the sum so paid. Held, that the plaintiff recover the tax paid.
Blodgett v. Holden, U. S. Sup. Ct., decided November 21, 1927.
The court, while it unanimously agreed that the plaintiff's gift was not
subject to be taxed, differed on its interpretation of the Act. Part of the court'
thought that the Act, in so far as it undertook to impose a tax on gifts inter
vivos made prior to its passage, was arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.' The remainder of the
court 5 was of the opinion that, since the amendment to Section 319 was to take
effect as of June 2, z924, it was a reasonable interpretation that the reduction
RETROAcTIvELY-In

Frew v. Bowers, 12 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) [certiorari granted,
47 Sup. Ct. 237 (I 9 2 6)].
"Re Brandreth, i69 N. Y. 437, 62 N. E. 563 (I902) ; Todd's Estate, supra
note 7. Cf. Polk v. Miles, 268 Fed. 175 (D. C. Md. 12o).
"Re Brandreth, supra note i2; Todd's Estate, supra note 7.
" This conclusion is in harmony with the decisions of state courts on the
subject. People v. Kelly, 218 Ill. 5o9, 78 N. E. io38 (io5) ; People v. Moir,
207 Ill. i8o, 69 N. E. 905 (19o4).
143 STAT. 313 (924),
244 STAT. 86 (1926).

U. S. C. (1925)

Trr. xxvi, §1131.

' Opinion of the Court given by Mr. Justice McReynolds.
'Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. I (i916) ; Barclay & Co. v.
Edwards, 267 U. S. 442 (1924); Nichols v. Coolidge, U. S. Sup. Ct., decided
May 31, 1927.
Concurring opinion given by Mr. Justice Holmes. In accord were Mr.
Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Sanford and Mr. Justice Stone.
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in the rates and the tax operate alike on gifts after that date. Consequently
it thought that the act did not purport to have retroactive operation' and should
be read as applying only to gifts made subsequent to its passage. The court
by this interpretation, gave effect to the principle: that of two possible constructions of a statute the one upholding its constitutionality should be selected.
Nevertheless, it is conjectural what the latter part of the court would have held
had it read the Act as applying retroactively. It is interesting to note that the
court did not render any dictum on the more important question of the validity
of taxing a gift made subsequent to the passage of the Act.8

TRUSTS-ENFRCEMENT OF A CHARITABLE TRUST-MUTUAL Wnzs-Under
a Connecticut statute,' the right to appeal from a decree of the probate court
is limited to those persons who can show that they are personally aggrieved by
the decree. Two sisters executed mutual wills, in which they bequeathed their
entire estates to each other. Eaclh will, however, contained a provision for the
creation of a trust fund, for the benefit of certain "white, Protestant, female
school'teachers" residing within a specified district, the actual beneficiaries to
be selected from the designated class by the trustees. The trust provisions
in the wills were to become effective on the express contingency that the other
sister predeceased the testatrix. Both wills were probated together, although
one sister died a short time before the other. Appellants wish to prosecute
appeals from the probate of the wills of both decedents, claiming to be beneficiaries under the trust provisions of the said wills. Held, (two judges dissenting), that appellants do not have sufficient pecuniary interest in either will
to be aggrieved by the decrees, and thus are not entitled to appeal. Averill v.
Lewis, 138 Atl. 815 (Conn. 1927).
The court clearly reached the proper conclusion in the case of the appeal
from the probate of the first will, because the trust provision in this will never
became operative, due to the fact that the second sister remained as survivor
of the first. The primary intent of both testatrices was to benefit each
other,' the trust being merely a secondary consideration, and thus the surviving
sister or her representatives were the only persons pecuniarily interested in the
probate of the first will. The interesting question was whether the appellants

See Reynolds v. MacArthur, 2 Pet. 417, 434 (U. S. 1829); Shwab v.
Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 534 (1922) ; Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, 251 (1925).
The words "for the calendar year 1924 and each calendar year thereafter" were
interpreted to indicate the periods to be regarded as distinguished from fiscal
years.
"United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 (I9o9) ; United
States. v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210 (1920); Panama R. R. v. Johnson,

264 U. S. 375

(1924).

'The District Court upheld the constitutionality of the gift tax even as applied retroactively. Blodget v. Holden, ii F. (2d) i8o (W. D. Mich. 1926).
For a discussion of the constitutionality of the gift tax see 74 U. oF PA L.
REv. 836 (1926); 39 HAv. L. REv. 888 (1926).
'CONN.

GEN. STAT. (1918)

§5071.

'Hadwen v. Myles [I925] I Ch. 75.
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as beneficiaries were aggrieved by the second decree. It was admitted, as the
beneficiaries were indefinite and uncertain, and only capable of being made certain by the selection of the trustees, that this was a public charitable trust.' In
such a trust it is generally held that the Attorney-General is the proper person
to effect the enforcement: This has been expressly enacted by statute in many
jurisdictions, including the one in which the instant case was decided.! In settling this particular question, the court in the principal case was of the opinion
that, notwithstanding the fact that this statute had not been invoked in the
motion to dismiss the appeals, nevertheless the reason behind the rule was that
beneficiaries of charitable trusts do not have sufficient interest in the subject
matter to appear in court themselves, and so the appellants could not possibly be
aggrieved by the decree! Just which members of the fluctuating class will
receive the actual benefit of the trust cannot be ascertained until the trustees
make their selection, hence no individual beneficiary had an interest sufficient
to entitle her to contest the probate of the will. The dissenting judges thought
that each individual appellint had a potential pecuniary interest in the trust
fund Their argument was based mainly on the case of Dailey v. New Haven,'
where the court held that if the Attorney-General would not enforce a charitable
trust, the beneficiaries themselves had the power to do so. They reasoned from
this principle that appellants had sufficient interest to appear in court, and consequently were capable of being aggrieved by the decree. In view of the
Dailey case as a binding authority on a Connecticut court, the dissenting opinion
is certainly based on a rational argument. But courts of other jurisdictions,
unfettered by such an authority, by following the general law applicable to
charitable trusts, should have little difficulty in arriving at a conclusion in
accord with the present one.

TRUSTS-FoLLOWING THE PROCEEDS OF A COLLECTION MADE 3Y ANI INSOLTRUST ComPANY-An insolvent trust company collected a note which they
had received for collection and remittance, and forwarded their draft to the
transmitting bank. By the time the draft was presented for payment, the trust
V.NT

I Green's Admrs. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 134 Ky. 311, 120 S. W. 283 (19o9) ;
In re Coleman's Estate, 167 Cal. 212, 138 Pac. 992 (914) ; Strong's Appeal,
68 Conn. 527, 37 Atl. 395 (1897) ; Harrington v. Pier, 1o5 Wis. 485, 8a N. W.
345 (1900).
'Attorney-General v. Garrison, IOI Mass. 223 (1869); People v. Braucher,
258 Ill. 604, ioi N. E. 944 (1913) ; 2 PRRY, TRUSTS (6th ed. 191x) §732; TUDOR,
* C ARI
AND MoR'AriN (4th ed. i9o6) 376.
'CONN.GEN. STAT. (I918) § 170.
'Burbank v. Burbank, 152 Mass. 254, 25 N. E. 427 (i go) ; Mackenzie v.
Trustees of the Presbytery of Jersey City, 67 N. J. Eq. 652, 61 Atl. 1027
(i9o5) ; People v. Braucher, supra note 4.
T
Mannix v. Purcell, 46 Ohio io2, I9 N. E. 572 (1888); Beatty v. Kurtz,
27 U. S. 566 (829).
'60 Conn. 314,,22 Atl. 945 (I89I).
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company was in the hands of the secretary of banking, and the drawee refused
to honor the draft. The trust company had mingled the proceeds of the collection with other money in their cash drawers and vaults. On the petition
of the transmitting bank to enforce a trust, Held, that there is no enforceable
trust, as the fund cannot be traced. Appeal of Cameron, 290 Pa. Super. 250
(1927).

Pennsylvania follows many other jurisdictions in the view that the proceeds of a collection constitute a trust fund, where there are special instructions
to collect and remit
Some jurisdictions hold to the contrary view, based
usually on the customs of banks as regards collections? Considering this custom, it would seem that "special instructions" should not include instructions
to "collect and remit," unless it be granted that the latter were intended to
impose the duty on the collecting bank to forward the money in specie or deposit
it in a special fund. In the principal case the court agreed with the lower court
that the proceeds were a trust fund, but were of the opinion that the fund
could not be traced, and rever6ed the lower court on this ground. Pennsylvania
follows the universal rule that a trust fund may be recovered so long as it can be
identified or traced into a particular fund or account which remains equal to
or in excess of the amount of the trust fund,' but will not apply the rule in cases
where the agent is authorized by law to handle funds of others and do a general banking business.' Other jurisdictions do not seem to make such a distinction? The desire to effect an equitable distribution of insolvent trust company estates, if not the reason for the Pennsylvania view, at least justifies it.
The decision of the court is based on the fact that the appellant was a trust
company doing a banking business. But under the facts, it seems that the
peculiar Pennsylvania law need not have been invoked, inasmuch as the proceeds were mingled with the general funds and therefore incapable of being
traced into any particular fund or account, regardless of whether the trustee
was a banking house or an individual.'
'American Can Co. v. Williams, 178 Fed. 42o (i91o), aff'g. 176 Fed. 816
(19o8); People v. Bank of Dansville, 39 Hun. 187 (N. Y. 1886); First Nat.
Bank v. Walker, 289 Pa. 252; McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. 173
(1886); MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (4th ed., 1903) §567.
'Gonyer v. Williams, i68 Cal. 452, 143 Pac. 736 (914) ; Bank v. Thomas,
28 Ill.
463 (1862) ; Bowr an v. Nat. Bank, 9 Wash. 614, 38 Pac. 212 (1894).
'Vosberg's Estate,"i79 Pa. 329, 123 Atl. 813 (924).
'Miller's Appeal, 218 Pa. 5o, 66 AUt. 995 (I9O7) ; Commonwealth v. Tradesman's Trust Co., (No. 2), 250 Pa. 378, 95 Atl. 577 (1915). In Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135, 117 Atl. 793 (1922), the general rule was applied in the case
of a broker, and the court stated that the result would have been otherwise had
the agent been a banking house instead of a broker.
'Ill. Trust and Saving Bank of Chicago Case, 15 Fed. 858, 21 Blatchf.
275 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1883).

' In a similar situation, where the trustee was a bank, the decision was put
squarely on the ground that the fund could not be traced into any particular
fund or account. Bank's Assigned Estate, i66 Pa. 622 (i895). See also, Ill.
Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago Case, supra note 5.
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Wu.M--CJNsTRucrIo OF Wow "RDEmARRY"-The testator left a certain
income to his wife, on condition that if she remarried, it was to be reduced.
She married, but the marriage being subsequently annulled by court decree, she
laid claim to the entire income. In proceedings to account, Held, that the condition made in the will had not occurred, so that her right to the income was not
divested. In re Mortek's Estate, 224 N. Y. Supp. 75 (1927).
The court, finding no precedent for the situation, confined itself to a consideration of the legal effect of the term "remarry" as hitherto construed in the
light of decisions holding that a marriage which has been avoided by a decree
of annulment is no marriage at all.1 It may be questioned whether due consideration was given the intent of the testator. It is a cardinal rule of testamentary construction that the testator's intent is paramount,' and, while it is to
be determined from the words he employs,' courts tend to be especially liberal
in their interpretation.' Therefore, whatever may be the established legal
effect or grammatical construction of the words used, that is not to govern
when opposed to the intention of the testator.' It may be fair to assume that
in using the word "remarry," the testator in the principal case, being ignorant
of any distinction between annulment and divorce,' had in mind a marriage
in fact, regardless of what might happen later by way of either annulment
or dissolution. If this was his intent, the condition was performed. However, it is also quite probable that he primarily wished to protect his
widow, and therefore what he intended by marriage was an event which
would give rise to certain rights and liabilities between the parties. And an
annulled marriage would not fulfil this condition. It is submitted that, lacking any evidence of intent aside from the express provision of the will, the court
was justified in its conclusion.
1

Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35 (1882) ; Steerman v. Snow, 94 N. J. Eq. 9, 118
Atl. 696 (1922) ; Baylis v. Baylis, 207 N. Y. 446, io N. E. 176 (i9W3).
'Lydon v. Campbell, 204 Mass. 58o, 9i N: E. i5i (1io) ; Close v. Farmers
Loan & Trust Co., 195 N. Y. 92, 87 N. E. ioo5 (i9o9) ; Mulliken v. Earnshaw,
209 Pa. 226, 58 Atl. 286 (i904).

IHertz v. Abrahams, nio Ga. 7o7, 36 S. E. 4o9 (1899).
'In re Heywood, 148 Cal. 184, 82 Pac. 755 (905).
'Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68 (U. S. i832).
'The distinction is discussed in NELSON, LAW OF DivocaE (1895) § 566.
1 Steerman v. Snow, Baylis v. Baylis, Roth v. Roth, all supra note I.

